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 Although victims of aggression, Croats have been labelled as intolerant and 
aggressor as imperilled. Several independent studies of tolerance have shown a 
relatively high level of political tolerance in Croatia. Since such results were 
contrary to the expected, in an American study data pointing to the toleration 
paradox were interpreted as inconsistent toleration. Also, some incidents that 
occurred in Croatia pertaining to the toleration paradox were used as 
indicators of the lack of tolerance. 
 
 Whenever Croats insisted on their cultural and political identity in the 
former Yugoslavia, Serbian propaganda on Croatian inclination to genocide, 
fascism and intolerance would gain momentum. Serbs, who dominated in 
all areas, spread such propaganda abroad through their legations. The re-
sults of such propaganda have in various ways negatively affected Croats, 
both those living in Croatia and those living abroad. Some of these conse-
quences will be discussed in more detail, particularly those related to po-
litical tolerance and its paradox. 
 Political tolerance is readiness to accept and tolerate those political op-
tions and their operationalization that we do not accept and towards 
which we have a negative attitude (Mendus, 1988; Sullivan, 1989). How-
ever, in order to tolerate something there must be a reason for that, so a 
politically tolerant person is always torn between rejecting the program of 
some political option and accepting its right to take part in political 
competition on equal terms. It is a conflict of personal interest and a 
general rule, of the ego and the super ego. In this conflict those who are 
tolerant choose the general rule, and those who are not the personal 
interest. 
 The point of toleration is not putting up with and tolerating due to 
the existence of a different interest, but in rational acceptance of the right 
of any interest to be realized on equal terms, regardless of our personal 
preferences. A politically tolerant person respects the democratically elected 
government even then when their party has lost in elections. Respecting 
the rules of the game is more important for a tolerant person that win-
ning by breaking them. A tolerant person has more difficulty putting up 
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with broken rules that accepting defeat in a fair competition. For them 
the freedom of choice is more important than personal choice. 
 A politically tolerant person opposes attempts to impose a ban on a 
political party even in cases when they do not at all approve of its pro-
gram. They are against banning such party from appearing in the media. 
On the other hand, a politically intolerant person will be in favor of ban-
ning a party they do not approve of and will oppose its appearance in 
the media.  
 However, when defining and researching political tolerance the tolera-
tion paradox should be taken into account. The toleration paradox lies in 
tolerating the intolerance which restricts freedom. Are we tolerant if we 
tolerate extreme social groups like fascists, Yugoslavs, communists, us-
tashas? As the negation of negation is not a negation, intolerance of fas-
cists, Yugoslavs, communists and ustashas is not an indication of political 
intolerance. 
 In the study on political tolerance in Croatia (Vujevi}, 1996), subjects 
were required to name a Croatian political party they least agreed with 
and to state their agreement or disagreement with banning it or banning 
it from appearing in the media. The subjects were also supposed to name 
a politician who they least liked and express their agreement or disagree-
ment with banning his/her appearance in the media. Apart from this, a 
number of other indicators such as the subjects' attitude to capital pun-
ishment, abortion, changes in the language etc. were applied. Also, a po-
litical tolerance scale was devised. 
 Out of the total of 772 subjects, the majority would not ban the politi-
cal party they least agree with, not would they ban such a party from ap-
pearing in the media. Also, most subjects were against capital punishment, 
against banning abortion, in favor of changes in the language and in favor 
of fostering dialects. On the political tolerance scale most subjects chose 
statements suggesting satisfactory political tolerance. All indicators suggested 
a relatively high level of political tolerance in Croatia (Vujevi}, 1996). 
Such results were not expected after long years of totalitarianism and in 
the midst of the war in Croatia. 
 One year later Americans conducted a survey in several European 
countries including Croatia. Some questions pertained to political tolerance, 
but the interpretation of the data on minority acceptance is disputable, 
which is why they are shown in Table 1. 
 Croatian public opinion of Krajina Serbs is extremely negative (94%), 
the most negative in relation to all European countries covered in the 
study. However, Croatian public opinion of Serbs living in Croatian cities 
is more on a positive side (52%) and equals the public opinion of immi-
grants among European nations in developed democracies. The difference 
between Croatian public opinion of Serbs living in Krajina and of those 
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living in Croatian cities was interpreted by American researchers as incon-
sistent tolerance. This is, however, not about inconsistency, but about the 
toleration paradox.  
 




(in per cent) 
Unacceptance 
(in per cent) 






Serbs Albanians 11 83 
Macedonians Albanians 28 65 
Albanians Greeks 47 49 
Bulgarians Turks 52 39 
Romanians Hungarians 50 40 
Slovaks Hungarians 43 53 
Latvians Russians 46 43 
French Immigrants 47 46 
British Immigrants 40 41 
Germans Immigrants 47 52 
 Source: Public Opinion in Croatia, USIA, 1995 
 
 As has already been emphasized, the paradox of tolerance involves the 
intolerance of intolerance. Upon the multi-party elections, when the demo-
cratically elected Croatian Parliament (Sabor) declared Croatian independ-
ence of Yugoslavia, Krajina Serbs opposed this decision by force of arms. 
Although independence is a legitimate right of any nation, Croatian were 
also granted this rights under the current Yugoslav constitution. At the 
referendum on independence, 94% of Croatian citizens voted in favor of 
independence. After that, Krajina Serbs, who made 4% in the population 
in Croatia, aided by the JNA occupied 25% of Croatian territory. Krajina 
Serbs engaged in atrocities, persecutions and massive destruction, eliminat-
ing all Croatian traces in the historically Croatian area, which had been 
internationally recognized as part of the Croatian state. Due to all this, it 
is quite understandable that Croats could not accept Krajina Serbs, which 
does not suggest their political intolerance. Those who do otherwise are 
intolerant (6%). 
 Data on the unacceptance of Krajina Serbs coincide with the data on 
the referendum on Croatian independence. If 94% of Croatian citizens 
voted for Croatian independence, it stands to reason to expect that an 
equal number of Croatian citizens (94%) would not accept Krajina Serbs, 
who opposed the referendum results by force of arms. In other words, the 
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above unacceptance figure (94%) does not suggest ethnic exclusivism. If it 
were ethnic exclusivism, the acceptance of Krajina Serbs and Serbs living 
in Croatian cities would be the same. However, although considering the 
same ethnic group, only 6% of Croats accept Krajina Serbs and as many 
as 48% accept urban Serbs. 
 The latter figure equals that on immigrant acceptance in Western 
European countries. Considering the fact that the Croatian data were ob-
tained in circumstances of war, in which 4% of Krajina Serbs occupied 
25% of Croatian territory, then 48% of acceptance of the same ethnic 
group living in Croatian cities undoubtedly suggests a relatively high ethnic 
tolerance. Most Serbs living in Croatian cities have relatives among Krajina 
Serbs, and have not, according to the majority of Croats, distanced them-
selves enough from the actions of their Krajina kinsmen. Still, Croats do 
not resent them at a percentage higher that at which Western European 
nations resent their minorities! 
 Similar conclusions are also suggested by some other data from the 
American study. In the following table comparative data on public opinion 
of one-nation state are shown. 
 
 Table 2: One-nation state preferences in some European states 











     Source: Public Opinion in Croatia, USIA, 1995 
 
 Even so, national exclusivism has been imputed to Croatia, particularly 
at the beginning of the war. According to some analysts, national exclusiv-
ism was the cause of the war in Croatia. However, results of various in-
dependent studies show a relatively high level of tolerance in Croatia, 
which is in some aspects even higher than in Western European democra-
cies that are supposed to serve as a role model. Even so, some incidents 
have been accounted for by a low level of tolerance in Croatia.  
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 Armed conflicts in the area of former Yugoslavia have also been ac-
counted for by insufficient tolerance. However, in his commentary on the 
findings of the study on national tolerance conducted by the Yugoslav As-
sociation of Institutes for Social Studies in 1989 and 1990 @upanov, 
among others, says: “In the republics which became battle-fields, the index 
of tolerance exceeded the statistical mean, which suggests that it is not 
intolerance that led to violence”. (@upanov, 1995:219) 
 Liberation of occupied areas has been accounted for by Croatian lack 
of tolerance, although it took place after numerous attempts to resolve the 
problem peacefully with the aid of the international community. While 
Croatia was being praised for its cooperation by some, others were em-
phasizing its lack of tolerance expecting Croatia to tolerate indefinitely the 
occupation of its vital territory. 
 The exodus of Krajina Serbs which resulted from the liberation of oc-
cupied areas was used as a proof of Croatian national exclusivism, al-
though it was a result of exclusivism demonstrated by Krajina Serbs, who 
were not willing to accept Croatia as their country. Even today they are 
setting conditions for their return which deny Croatian sovereignty. 
 Tolerance does not rule out banning the return to those Serbs who do 
not accept the Republic of Croatia as their country. Citizenship is not just 
a geographical concept, it is also a political concept. A citizen of a state 
cannot be someone who does not accept that state. Croatian Serbs have 
to accept the Republic of Croatia as their country if they want to live 
there as its citizens. Croatia must grant them all civil and ethnic rights to 
ensure their national identity in Croatia, but in a patriotic sense. 
 Indeed, imposing a ban on the return of those who do not recognize 
the Republic of Croatia is not an act of intolerance. Their return does 
not imply returning to the same political reality. Political situation on the 
former territory of the Socialist Republic of Croatia has been changed by 
the establishment of an independent state, the Republic of Croatia. A 
large number of Serbian refugees do not want to return to such a Croa-
tia. Toleration of those who do not tolerate the Croatian state is not 
tolerance. 
 In other words, tolerance includes both acceptance and unacceptance, 
but we must make sure that the acceptance is not suicidal, and the unac-
ceptance inhuman. It would be suicidal to allow those who do not accept 
the Republic of Croatia to return, and it would be inhuman to ban the 
return of those who were misled, but now accept the Republic of Croatia. 
Tolerant behavior implies banning the return of those who do not accept 
the Republic of Croatia, punishing those who have committed crimes, for-
giving those who were misled, but did not commit crimes during the re-
bellion against the Republic of Croatia on condition that they now accept 
Croatia as their country. 
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 Collective amnesty is as unjustified as collective guilt. Horrible crimes 
have been committed on the territory of Croatia. Those who committed 
them have names. Croatia has the obligation to name them. Most of them 
fled Croatia, some would like to return but do not recognize the Republic 
of Croatia. Croatia must not let them return for its own security, for the 
crimes they have committed and for those they would commit in the fu-
ture if they were allowed to return to the country. A mass return of Ser-
bian refugees would be suicidal for Croatia, and imposing a ban on the 
return of all Serbs would be unjust, even if there was just one person en-
titled to return. This is why the issue of the return of Serbian refugees 
has to be tackled distriminately. 
 Collective guilt should be distinguished from blaming everyone. Collec-
tive guilt implies blaming everyone for belonging to a collective body 
which committed a particular crime, and not for participating in the crime. 
When a discriminate approach is applied, those who did not participate in 
a crime are cleared of responsibility. Such an approach can also lead to 
the conclusion that all members of a collective body are to blame. 
However, all need not be equally guilty, nor should they be held equally 
responsible. All of them need not be tolerated equally, either. 
 Criminals must be tried for war crimes against humanity according to 
international laws. For the war crimes against the Republic of Croatia they 
should be tried according to the laws of the Republic of Croatia. Toler-
ance implies forgiveness, and Croatia has passed a law on amnesty, but all 
cannot and must not be forgiven. There are some conditions that one 
must fulfil to be forgiven even the forgivable. You cannot be forgiven un-
less you admit your guilt. Those who admit their guilt can be partly for-
given, and those who do not are prepared to commit crimes again. For-
giving those who do not admit to crimes encourages new crimes. Tol-
erance does not imply turning a blind eye, overlooking crimes. 
 Tolerance is supposed to help lower the crime rate and prevent crime. 
In order for the crime rate to drop and to prevent crime, they should be 
well explained. The better a crime is explained the lesser the urge for re-
venge and the readier we are to forgive. Both the criminal and the victim 
create the conditions for tolerance. If there is no admission of guilt, there 
is no basis for forgiveness. Without admission, we do not know who the 
criminal is, nor who the victim is. Only the victim can forgive, but even 
they have no right to revenge. Victims, too, must respect certain legal and 
moral codes in order to make the difficult situation easier for both the 
victim and the criminal. 
 Tolerance is not just a character trait. It includes the ability to reason 
and act in accordance with the highest level of human personality. Man is 
a being that can control their temper and discipline it. Tolerance is about 
effective control of the id and the ego by the superego. It is, before all, 
a moral trait aimed at “transcending or overcoming the present condition 
in general human terms” (Filipovi}, 1984:217). 
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 We have seen Croats emphasizing Catholic moral codes such as 
“Forgive!”, “Do not hate!” and “Love your enemy” even in the midst of 
the war. On the other hand, the aggressors tended to emphasize the Or-
thodox principle “Revenge is better than sainthood”. The difference be-
tween the two is quite obvious and the conduct of the two religious 
groups differed even more, since revenge is not right even if there is a 
reason for it. Armed aggression against Croatia as a revenge was an “act 
of retaliation for the pains, insults, losses” (Ani}, 1991:429), that Serbs 
suffered due to the fact that Croats established their independent state on 
their own territory and within internationally recognized borders. 
 Even when faced with armed aggression, Croats made a point of main-
taining moral discipline, defending themselves from those whose evil deeds 
demonstrated the absence of any form of discipline. If this had not been 
so, they would not have resort to arms when the Croatian democratically 
elected parliament declared Croatian independence after the referendum at 
which 94% of Croatian citizens voted in favor of it. The brutality of the 
aggressor in the war against Croatia is a result of the absence of moral 
discipline. 
 The outcome of the war suggests that morality prevails over immorality. 
The unrestrained aggressor was armed to the teeth, and the Croats were 
practically unarmed. Nevertheless, they won due to the kind of strength 
that is not gained from mere physical force, but due to their spiritual 
power, the kind of power that at critical times made most Croatian de-
fenders put spiritual needs before biological needs in an unequal fight to 
survive. 
 Even so, Croats have been labelled as intolerant, although compared to 
other European states they demonstrate the lowest level of national exclu-
sivism. This can be explained by the fact that many people are not ac-
quainted with the concept of the toleration paradox, but also by the fact 
that there are quite a few others who cannon come to terms with the 
break-up of the former state. 
 Even though enslavement of a nation is the worst of all crimes 
(Toynbee), such crimes were suppressed, and those resulting from at-
tempted enslavement exaggerated. This is how the myth about Jasenovac 
came into being. In this myth the number of victims was exaggerated to 
the extent that it exceeded the total number of World War II victims in 
all Yugoslavia (Tu|man, 1990). Blowing up the figures had the purpose to 
prove that Croats are genocidal, particularly at times when Croats sought 
independence. 
 This was the case just before the democratic elections, and the satani-
zation of the Croatian people reached its peak after the referendum on 
independence and the decision made by the democratically elected Parlia-
ment on Croatian independence. This was followed by armed aggression 
on Croatia. The actual situation could by no means justify the aggression, 
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but it was given certain connotations in order to have a pretext for the 
aggression. Indeed, when a situation is defined as a real situation, it is 
real in its consequences (Thomas, 1967). Serbs defined the establishment 
of the independent Croatian state as an act of creating a fascist state of 
a genocidal nation and, unfortunately, acted as if this had been the case. 
They even managed to convince a part of the world. 
 In the beginning, when they had a big advantage, Serbs unrestrainedly 
destroyed all Croats calling them genocidal people, fascists and ustashas, 
levelling their houses, churches and all that was even remotely Croatian. 
When the tables were turned, they all fled either in panic or in an or-
ganized way. A mass exodus was organized in order to prove that Croats 
were genocidal. Serbs left in such huge numbers because some wanted to 
escape punishment for the crimes they had committed, and those who had 
not committed crimes ran away for fear because they believed Croats were 
genocidal. Those who are not well informed and who do not favor Croats 
are still emphasizing that Serbian brutality and their mass exodus were a 
result of Croats' national exclusivism. 
 In spite of the armed aggression and the brutality displayed by Krajina 
Serbs in their fight against Croatian independence, the majority of Croats 
accept the idea of Croatia as a multi-ethnic state where minority groups 
are represented in the parliament, where they are free to establish politi-
cal parties that will protect their rights and where they have the right to 
establish organizations that will protect and develop their traditions and 
culture. (Public Opinion in Croatia, USIA, 1995:7) Regardless of these and 
such research results, some still believe that Croats are bad guys and 
Serbs good guys, because they adopted the preconceptions about genocidal 
Croats, and still believe they are real. 
 In order to prove that Croats lack tolerance, it is often pointed out 
that the fascination with the state neutralizes the opposition and disrupts 
the development of democracy (Miri}, 1996). Croats are indeed fascinated 
with their state. Every political party of some importance has emphasized 
this in their program and name. As many as 94% of Croatian citizens 
voted for the independent Croatian state at the referendum. The demo-
cratically elected Croatian parliament made the decision on the establish-
ment of the independent Croatian state. Indeed, the Croatian state is un-
doubtedly a paramount value in Croatian political life. 
 However, the state is not a super-value. If it were, Croats would have 
equally loved all the states they lived in. Croats do not want their own 
state for its own sake, but for the aim it is supposed to achieve. The ex-
istence of any nation without a state is threatened, and establishing their 
own state represents an effort to ensure national continuity. Therefore, the 
state is an instrumental value which is indispensable for national con-
tinuity, and this is, indeed, a super-value without which no other value 
can be realized. 
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 State is an instrumental value and national continuity a target value. 
There is no democracy without the state. There is no democracy without 
free opposition, but a distinction should be made between opposition 
against the Croatian state and opposition against Croatian government. 
Opposition against the Croatian state denies Croatian continuity, and there-
fore cannot be tolerated (toleration paradox), and opposition against the 
Croatian government must be tolerated in a society striving for democracy. 
 However, the distinction between the words 'state' and 'government' is 
often not made and at times even deliberately confused, which allows the 
weakness of the Croatian government to be used as a pretext for making 
statements about the weakness of the Croatian state. Also, criticism of 
government policy is interpreted as an attack on the Croatian state. The 
state represents the people (citizens) living in a certain area who are po-
litically organized. Government is a form of political organization. The 
German state did not cease to be the German state just because it was 
transformed from a fascist to a democratic state. In other words, 
“opposition” against the Croatian state is a struggle against the continuity 
of the Croatian people, but opposition against the Croatian government 
isn't. 
 Moreover, when speaking of the Independent State of Croatia (NDH - 
Croatian state during World War II), a distinction should be made be-
tween describing it as a criminal state (Goldstein) and a state with a 
criminal government, although every nation should to as certain extent be 
held accountable for its government. The majority of Croats opposed the 
fascist government of NDH, but did not oppose an independent Croatian 
state. Croatian partisans, too, fought for the political independence of the 
Croatian people. This is why they were criticized and persecuted by the 
federal communist government of Yugoslavia. For many people NDH was 
a criminal state, but because it was Croatian, rather than because it was 
fascist. The Republic of Croatia is treated likewise by some people. 
 The “opposition” against the Croatian state resents the expression “our 
state”. They emphasize: “The state is not good because it is ours, but it 
should be ours because it is good!” (Miri}, 1996:101). However, the state 
cannot be good, unless it is ours, but it is not good only because it is 
ours. Aren't the tragic examples of nations without their own states 
speaking for themselves? It is of utmost importance to have our own 
state, but the fact that it is ours does not guarantee democracy and free-
dom. It is true, though, that the word “our” can be and is used to cover 
up for some weakness of the government. 
 The essence of political tolerance should be clearly distinguished from 
its manifestations, since the intolerance of the intolerance is tolerance. Not 
tolerating the aggression on Croatia, those who deny the Croatian state 
and those who do not respect the democratically elected government is 
not an indication of the lack of tolerance (toleration paradox). 
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 According to a large number of independent studies, the level of politi-
cal tolerance in Croatia is significantly higher than expected. This fact 
might have come as surprise, which is not a toleration paradox, but a 
wrong hypothesis. Some manifestations of intolerance in Croatia are not 
indicators of the lack and tolerance and its inconsistency, but are related 
to the toleration paradox. 
 Croatian culture is extremely diverse, which is why a high level of tol-
erance should be expected as a result. Tolerance allows for differences, 
and differences increase tolerance. However, “tolerance is not always desir-
able, and intolerance is not always something to be avoided (Kasachkoff, 
1994:300), because “tolerance has made this world even worse than neces-
sary by allowing preventable evil” (Horton, 1994:253). This is why Croats 
could not tolerate the occupation by Krajina Serbs, the denial of their 
state and the disrespect for the democratically elected government. It is 
about the toleration paradox, and not its inconsistency, as it might have 
seemed to the American researchers. (Public Opinion in Croatia, 1995:8) 
It is neither about the lack of tolerance, as it seems to those opposing 
the Croatian state. 
 Croatia must not allow a mass return of Serbian refugees, since most 
of them do not accept Croatia as their country. They define the situation 
in Croatia within the framework of Great-Serbian ideology and would act 
again in accordance with that ideology. If they are going to return, they 
must abandon their key positions and base their attitude towards Croats 
on actual circumstances, and not myths which made them instruments in 
the attempted realization of Great-Serbian ideology. 
 Despite the prejudices resulting from Serbian propaganda, the findings 
of most independent studies suggest a relatively high level of political tol-
erance in Croatia compared to European countries which have a long tra-
dition of democracy. The unacceptance of Krajina Serbs, the liberation of 
occupied territories, ban on a mass return of Serbian refugees, all these 
are not indicators of the lack of tolerance in Croatia, but of the tolera-
tion paradox. The paradox of toleration lies in the intoleration of intoler-
ance, and Croats could tolerate neither the aggressors and the occupation 
nor can they now tolerate the return of the defected aggressors who do 
not recognize the Republic of Croatia. 
 Conclusions: 
 1. Whenever Croats insisted on their cultural and political identity, Ser-
bian propaganda on Croatian inclination to genocide, fascism and national 
exclusivism would gain momentum. 
 2. Results of most independent studies suggest a relatively high level of 
political tolerance in Croatia, which is by some indicators even higher that 
in European nations with a long democratic tradition. 
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 3. However, the way people act is not determined by facts, but by the 
way they see the facts. Serbian perspective of Croats as genocidal, fascist-
like and nationally exclusive people led to their aggression on Croatia in 
which they acted as if Croats actually were genocidal, fascist-like and na-
tionally exclusive, because preconceptions are real in their consequences. 
 4. Croats could not accept the aggressors and the occupation of their 
territory, which is why they engaged in actions aimed at liberating those 
territories. During these actions Krajina Serbs fled Croatia in huge num-
bers. Here too, their preconceptions on Croats as genocidal people were 
real in their consequence - their mass flight. 
 5. Unacceptance of Krajina Serbs, fighting to liberate the occupied 
Croatian territories and the ban on mass return of Serbian refugees who 
do not recognize the Republic of Croatia, these are not indicators of the 
lack of tolerance, but of the toleration paradox, the tolerance which is 
manifested in the intoleration of intolerance. 
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